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Public-private favela-upgrading schemes in São Paulo (known as Urban Operations) manage to 
collect and allocate more funds than the conventional public upgrading. It would thus be safe to 
assume that favela-upgrading interventions financially backed by Urban Operations are more 
successful in bringing up indicators related to infrastructure and public services than the 
conventional public schemes. It might as well be assumed that public-private upgrading also 
provides economic opportunities and more perceived safety. This is what I have investigated in 
this thesis. My methods for this research entailed the conduction of semi-structured interviews 
and informal talks, the consultation of government reports, census data, and real-estate 
information, as well as taking on-site pictures and the conduction of non-participant 
observations.  
I selected one case study for each type of upgrading scheme. My findings mostly point to the fact 
that conventionally-funded upgrading and Urban Operations-backed favela interventions 
achieved similar results in the selected cases, especially when it comes to providing housing 
affordability, as well as public services, facilities, and infrastructure. Perceived levels of safety 
also evolved similarly in the studied communities. Economic and real-estate development 
followed different paths, which nevertheless also resulted in a few similarities. Overall, my 
analysis showed that the rationale of favela upgrading has reasonably evolved throughout the last 
decades. Yet, the reality of the upgraded communities that I studied still seems to be unmet by 
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1. Introduction  
 
 The purpose of this thesis is to address one significant issue that many planners have been 
grappling with worldwide: how to house the urban poor? This is a question that surely implies a 
complex answer; yet, especially in developing countries such as Brazil, this has become a 
recurrent and necessary inquiry. Urban housing in South America’s largest nation has been 
marred in many cases by physical precarity, low access to the formal market, poor access to job 
locations, and by other challenges. As an illustration, in 2010, about one third (32.7%) of 
households in Brazil was not connected to adequate sewage infrastructure1 (IBGE 2010). In 
states such as Tocantins, 82% of households did not have adequate sewage coverage. In São 
Paulo State, 94.7% of residences were connected to such a service in a proper way; however, 
when it comes to favela households, only 68.4% presented an adequate sewage coverage (ibid.). 
In São Paulo City, the Housing Department (SEHAB) has been carrying out improvement 
attempts for decades. Initially, clearance was the main housing policy in the city. That meant that 
many of the local less affluent citizens ended up relocated to social housing condominiums on 
the city outskirts, which are far from most workplaces and which imply commuting times of 
sometimes over 2 hours in the morning and additional 2 hours in the evening. In the first decade 
of the 2000s, SEHAB shifted its policy to on-site upgrading, according to which a small 
proportion of favela residents are to be rehoused in most cases. When that happens, they are 
usually resettled in the same favela. 
                                               
1 The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics considers sewage “adequate” if it corresponds to general 





While housing policies shifted, funding schemes for upgrading interventions also 
evolved. In the 1990s, the City Hall established the Urban Operations (or Operações Urbanas 
Consorciadas), which are major urban redevelopment schemes that, among other features, 
collect resources to be allocated into favela upgrading. Urban Operations (henceforth UOs) are 
public-private enterprises, which contrast with the mainstream publicly-funded favela 
interventions. 
As I will show in this thesis, UO-backed upgrading schemes tend to gather more 
resources than publicly-funded interventions. For instance, Real Parque, which is my UO case-
study, received about 4.5 times more funding resources per household than Sapé, which is my 
conventionally-funded, favela-upgrading example. Having that in mind, I started this research 
with the hypothesis that the former funding scheme reached better results than the latter if I were 
to compare variables such as levels of economic opportunities, affordability, public services, 
infrastructure provision, perceived safety, and real-estate impact. 
 My research question is: 
 
What is the difference in outcomes between favela-upgrading cases funded by Urban 
Operations and by cases funded by public money?  
 
This impact should be related to the following variables: (i) level of local economic 
opportunities (i.e. do they generate any jobs or income as a byproduct?), (ii) provision of urban 
public services, (iii) provision of infrastructure, (iv) safety perception in the studied favelas, and 





During the conduction of my research, I realized that one other variable was worth 
analyzing: housing affordability. It proved to be important as I conducted my interviews and 
noticed that upgrading heavily affected residents’ capacity to afford their bills after the works. 
For me to certify or refute my initial assumption, it was essential to understand how one 
can evaluate the impacts of favela upgrading. I can anticipate that there is no precise way to do 
this type of assessment; nevertheless, after doing a thorough literature review on this issue and 
after having worked with favela upgrading for two years at the São Paulo City Housing 
Department (SEHAB), I was able to understand the rationale of upgrading schemes and the 
reality of upgraded communities. This definitely helped me carry out my analysis. 
 This thesis is mostly based on a qualitative approach. I have selected two case studies: (1) 
Sapé, where the conventional type of upgrading was carried out and (2) Real Parque, where a 
public-private partnership was implemented. I selected these two case studies for several reasons, 
being the most significant one my previous knowledge of these two favelas. Between October, 
2014 and October, 2016, I worked at SEHAB and visited those two settlements. I had a special 
background knowledge of Sapé, whose upgrading works I would inspect once a week in a given 
time frame. I also knew a few residents from these favelas, as well as social workers and 
architects that were either my colleagues at the Housing Department or who were hired by firms 
that supported the conduction of the upgrading works—called gerenciadoras, or “managing 
firms.” Conveniently, both settlements also had a relatively similar number of households. 
Lastly, both Sapé and Real Parque are in an intermediary urban area in São Paulo (see Figure 6), 
which is neither the Downtown area (Centro), nor the periferia, or the urban fringes.  
Nevertheless, there a few key location differences between the surroundings of the two 





which overlooks a burgeoning corporate district—a more comprehensive background of the two 
case studies and their surroundings will be given in Chapter 3. Those urban similarities and 
differences have allowed me to compare many variables in a fitting way and have also been 
helpful for me to frame specific hypotheses, such as the one under which I assumed that the 
upgrading of Real Parque would result in a more prominent increase in market values in its 
surrounding district. I will cover more about that in Chapter 7. 
I have also conducted 9 semi-structured interviews and a few informal talks with favela 
residents, social workers, urban planners, and a representative from the São Paulo real-estate 
market. A few of these interviews and talks were held in the field (Favela do Sapé and Real 
Parque), a few of them were carried out at the SEHAB headquarters, and one interview was 
conducted at a private architecture firm. Regarding my interviewees, I had a convenience 
sample, as I selected my interviewees based on either my previous knowledge of them or on 
referrals made by people I knew. In Sapé, I wanted to talk to at least one resident from the 
newly-built condominiums and to one from the reminiscent area—which I managed to 
accomplish. In Real Parque, I sought to interview at least two residents from different 
households. Fortunately, during my field visit to that area, I managed to talk to one extra dweller. 
I also talked to one architect that worked in Sapé’s upgrading and one architect that worked in 
Real Parque. I tried to repeat the same procedure with social workers; however, I was just able to 
interview one professional that assisted in Real Parque’s works. As for Sapé, although I was not 
able to officially interview the social worker that I previously had in mind, I could hold an 
informal talk with another social worker from this settlement. I also talked to one real-estate 





It is important to point out that it is extremely difficult to choose interviewees in favelas. 
In Real Parque, I was accompanied during my field visit by one well-know SEHAB officer in the 
area; yet, whenever I tried to approach any resident to ask for permission to carry out interviews, 
they would back off. I associate that with their fear to speak—even if anonymously—in a context 
in which drug dealers have a huge amount of power and control over favelas. In fact, members of 
the local gang are all over watching people in these communities. I was able to have a sense of 
that as soon as the SEHAB officer and I arrived in Real Parque. As soon as I took my phone out 
of my pocket to take a picture of the area, one observer—or olheiro—approached me and angrily 
inquired who I was and why I was taking pictures of the area. 
 I have also relied on real-estate statistic data and on two datasets about the chosen case 
studies. I have also produced a few maps and have taken on-site pictures. Some of the 
reproduced images in this thesis were kindly provided by SEHAB or were already made 
available on online databases. Unfortunately, there was no information on residents’ 
socioeconomic conditions and on the physical situation of Sapé and Real Parque after the 
upgrading works. 
 This thesis is structured into eight chapters. This first chapter is a brief introduction on the 
adopted methodology and is also a roadmap for the work to be presented. Chapter 2 provides the 
reader with an introduction to favela upgrading in São Paulo, as well as with a background to 
what has been done abroad when it comes to vulnerable settlements’ intervention. Chapter 3 
gives a background of the two selected case studies for this thesis. Also, in this chapter I will 
discuss methods of assessing favela-upgrading interventions. Chapter 4 starts the analysis per se 





one of the primary aims of contemporary upgrading in São Paulo: the provision of infrastructure 
to communities. 
 Chapter 5 will analyze the implementation of public services in Sapé and Real Parque and 
the effect of both types of upgrading on safety issues there. Chapter 6 will compare how both 
upgrading approaches influenced on the creation of local economic opportunities and how they 
impacted on affordability on the residents’ end. Chapter 7 will end the series of comparisons by 
assessing the impacts of public and public-private upgrading on the real-estate market of the 
targeted communities and of the immediate surroundings. Chapter 8 will be this work’s 
conclusion. 
 The results from this research will hopefully serve as inputs for future research on favela 
upgrading and for further policymaking. After reading this thesis, planners in Brazil shall be 
more prepared to adjust current upgrading alternatives or to come up with new ones. All those 
study-backed alternatives should aim at facilitating the promotion of social justice and equal 
opportunities, especially on the favela residents’ end. Additionally, this research will give voice 
to those residents and amplify their demands for better urban policies in São Paulo and in the rest 





2. Understanding Favela-Upgrading Schemes  
   
“The term informal settlement upgrading does not have a clear and concise definition. Thus it 
applies to any sector-based intervention that results in a quantifiable improvement in the quality 
of life of the residents affected.”  
 
Abbott 2002, 307 
 
 
“It seems that all national and international housing and planning agencies mis-state housing 
problems by applying quantitative measures to non- on or only partly quantifiable realities.” 
 
Turner 1976, 61 
 
 
2.1 Definition of “Favela” and “Slum” 
 Favelas and similar settlements may have different names and definitions according to the 
place where they are found. The Brazilian government has defined favelas as a type of settlement 
that usually combines squatting, an irregular street layout, and a lack in the coverage of basic 
services (such as garbage pickup and sewage collection). According to the Brazilian Institute of 
Geography and Statistics (IBGE), a settlement of at least 51 residences laid out in such 
conditions constitutes a favela (IBGE 2010). This institute has officially labeled such type of 
settlement as aglomerado subnormal, or something in the lines of “subnormal agglomeration.” 
 The United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) uses the word “slum” 
to refer to settlements that lack basic services, present substandard housing or illegal and 
inadequate building structures, are highly dense and overcrowded, present unhealthy living 
conditions or are in hazardous locations, lack tenure security, do not comply with land-use plans, 





“loose and deprecatory” (11) in many ways; yet, multilateral institutions need to adopt a general 
language to address their issues. 
 Fortunately, UN-Habitat also considers regional terms that may more accurately replace 
“slums.” “Favela” is listed under the Global Report on Human Settlements as a specific term for 
the Brazilian context. 
 The Observatório de Favelas, or Observatory of Favelas, which is an organization 
focused on research and on urban policy-making directed at favelas, defines this type of 
settlement as a territory where state policies have historically been absent, as well as a place 
where investments from the formal market (i.e. real estate, financial, and services) are scarce. 
The Observatory also explains that, in favelas, the built environment, often marked by self-help, 
does not predominantly comply with urban ordinances. Lastly, this organization defines favelas 
as a multicultural territory, where different human backgrounds meet and where there is an 
expressive presence of African-Brazilians and indigenous populations (Souza e Silva et al. 
2009). 
 
2.2 Historical and Geographical Contexts of Favelas 
The first favela in Brazil is believed to be Rio de Janeiro’s Providência, which, according 
to Brazil’s popular favela narrative, appeared right after the Canudos War (1896-97). History has 
it that, after winning this military conflict, soldiers who fought it in Northeastern Brazil went 
back to Rio—then the nation’s capital—and were left homeless by the federal government. The 
solution that those war veterans found was to occupy the Providência Hill, or Morro da 





Nevertheless, scholars are able to say what came next to this likely birth. In short, urban 
renewal attempts carried out in the early 1900s in Rio de Janeiro, which according to Zaluar and 
Alvito (2003, 7) were an attempt by the officials of the early Republic to transform the capital 
into an “European city,” fostered the multiplication of favelas in Rio. As a consequence of these 
renewal attempts, many tenements in central areas were demolished and the urban poor who 
originally inhabited those tenements ended up occupying insalubrious areas, such as steep 
hillsides and swamps. 
In São Paulo, favelas would first be spotted after a few decades, as the city started to 
grow steadily in the twentieth century and as its first major housing issues started to emerge. 
Historians usually consider that the initiative that paved the way for the appearance of those 
settlements in the city was the 1942 Renter’s Law, which was a federal decree that froze rents in 
Brazil. According to Bonduki (1998), this piece of legislation stimulated landlords to divert 
investments from their housing stock to other economic activities. As a result, the production of 
housing units decreased and many low-income renters had to seek other dwelling alternatives—
such as favelas and peripheral subdivisions. 
 Favelas in São Paulo are mostly found on the city’s urban fringes (see Figures 6 and 7 in 
the next chapter). Mautner (1999) explains that this location pattern took place due to the cheap 
and empty land available in these areas, whose occupation was made possible by 
autoconstruction2 and by an easier access provided by the advent of buses. Although favelas are 
mostly in peripheral land, their settlement patterns also apply to favelas in central 
neighborhoods. The latter group was set over abandoned plots or in unoccupied floodplains. The 
                                               
2 Autoconstruction can also be called self-help. Under this type of housing production, the urban poor in São Paulo 





common ground between central and peripheral favelas is that their residents sought to occupy 
areas that were either cheap or left out due to reasons of insalubrity or due to being distant from 
workplaces in Downtown São Paulo. 
 Throughout the 1970s, economic crises affected Brazil and engendered unemployment, 
wages devaluation, and increases in the cost of living. Additionally, a 1979 federal bill—the 
Lehmann Law—was passed and made peripheral subdivisions without infrastructure—which 
were common in Greater São Paulo—illegal. As a consequence, favelas started to multiply in 
São Paulo as the feasible alternative that was left (Zuquim 2012). 
 In response, until the mid-1980s, the city government carried out favela clearances—
which could end either in residents being indefinitely displaced or in their transfer to housing 
condos on the city outskirts. 
 Since the mid-1980s, the São Paulo City Hall has been slowly shifting its housing 
policies. Under mayor Paulo Maluf, the showcased housing program was the so-called 
Cingapura. Named after the East Asian country and its success in providing state-sponsored 
housing, this 1990s program was what many critics called a makeup intervention. It consisted of 
demolishing favela shacks and replacing them with apartment buildings usually in areas that 
were highly visible—such as in blocks that faced busy avenues and at the entrances of São Paulo 
(Bueno 2000, 82-83). 
 The final stage of favela upgrading comprises the urban- and land-regularization 
processes (Zuquim et al. 2017), which correspond to adjusting these settlements to the urban 





 Favela-upgrading schemes may lead to different outcomes depending on how they are 
conducted. As some of this thesis interviewees put it, the success of an upgrading project is tied 
to the amount of funds that is invested, to the residents’ ability to enjoy upgraded spaces, and to 
their capacity to afford living in upgraded communities. I would add that the success of a project 
also depends on the provision of public facilities and services to settlements, as well as on the 
community cohesion that results from the upgrading rearrangements. 
 As favela-upgrading policies evolved in São Paulo, the possibility of setting up public-
private partnerships that could help fund improvements in poor settlements emerged. These 
partnerships led to upgrading schemes which originated from an urban mechanism adopted by 
successive city administrations: the Urban Operations (UOs). Known in Portuguese as 
Operações Urbanas Consorciadas, this mechanism allows real-estate developers to build an 
extra FAR3 inside an urban perimeter as long as they pay a compensation for that. A percentage 
of this compensation has to be invested in the upgrading of favelas that are within the perimeter 
or close to it. Under the Urban Operations scheme, resources from private investors are 
channeled into the upgrading of those settlements in a scheme that is managed by SP Urbanismo, 
a mixed-capital agency. 
 If real-estate investors show a significant interest in developing the UO urban perimeter, 
many monetary resources can be collected and the upgrading of favelas tends to be more 
comprehensive in terms of numbers of delivered housing units. That means that, instead of 
replacing shacks by a limited number of units, the City Hall can usually afford to demolish all 
                                               
3 In São Paulo, FAR (Floor Area Ratio) translates as Coeficiente de Aproveitamento Básico (Basic Building 





precarious residences and rehouse their inhabitants in brand-new apartments. This 
comprehensive type of upgrading is labeled by Mariutti et al. (2016) as “complete removal.”  
 The other type of upgrading is the conventional one, which receives public resources. 
Since no money comes from private partners, the conventional favela-upgrading scheme is 
usually more limited, which implies rehousing only a percentage of the vulnerable families from 
a settlement. The prioritized families are usually those who live in extremely precarious 
shacks—such as the ones made by wood instead of brickwork—, those who inhabit landslide 
areas and floodplains, and those whose residences are on the way of infrastructural components 
to be implemented as part of the upgrading project. Families are also relocated for being in areas 
that will receive the limited number of apartment blocks. This is a “partial removal,” (ibid.) 
process. 4 
 Urban Operations have been praised by some policy-makers, as this mechanism enables 
the real-estate market to help the City Hall obtain resources for urban renewal. As one architect 
from the São Paulo Housing Department (SEHAB) told me, when compared to conventional 
upgrading, “Urban Operations are a wealthier source [of funds].” However, that is not to say that 
public-private upgrading schemes necessarily result in more successful projects. 
  
2.3 Measuring the Outcomes of Upgrading 
 There is no precise guide on how to measure the outcomes of upgrading projects. 
However, São Paulo’s Housing Department has traditionally clung to counting the decrease in its 
                                               
4 There is an interesting discussion around the effects of partial removals and complete removals. Apart from 
resulting in more costs, scholars also tend to argue that the latter type of favela intervention cuts community 





housing deficit as the main yardstick for measurement. In short, the City Hall defines housing 
deficit as a situation in which there is at least one of the following components: (1) housing 
precarity, (2) different families living in the same household, (3) excessive rent onus and (4) 
excessive density in rented households (São Paulo 2016(c)). But what would Planning literature 
possibly say about it? 
There are a few ways to conduct research in the Urban Planning field, being two of the 
most recurrent the quantitative and qualitative methods. Creswell (2014, 4) explains that the 
former is “an approach for testing objective theories by examining the relationship among 
variables. These variables, in turn, can be measured, typically on instruments, so that numbered 
data can be analyzed using statistical procedures.” When it comes to housing, John Turner (1976, 
61) says that “quantitative methods can only indicate, not measure, non-quantifiable 
components—the human realities of housing.” 
 What does Turner mean by “human realities of housing?” And, given that favela 
upgrading in São Paulo does not place most of its focus on housing anymore, how do this 
author’s idea apply to contemporary upgrading?   
 Let us start with the second question. John Turner and other prominent urban scholars 
and practitioners have placed great emphasis on the housing component of favela—or, to borrow 
the term many of them used, “slum”—upgrading. Although initiatives such as sites-and-services, 
which are primarily based on infrastructure provision as a conditioner for housing, have been 
attempted in the recent past, vulnerable-settlement upgrading has historically been focused on 
housing. As explained previously in this chapter, this was also true within the specific context of 
São Paulo, where favela clearance and rehousing initiatives where the mainstream housing 





 However, assessments made by urban assistance institutions such as the World Bank 
have revealed that these regular past approaches have proven unsuccessful in many ways. Cohen 
(2001, 44) explains that  
 
[i]f the projects [which included housing] enjoyed physical success, they were nevertheless facing 
numerous time-consuming obstacles and institutional problems such as land acquisition, 
tendering and awarding of construction contracts, inadequate cost recovery and inadequate 
coordination among public sector agencies. 
   
 Cohen also adds that the scale of the projects, when compared to their general demand 
was inadequate (ibid.). In other words, the growing number of urban poor in need of assistance 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s was not significantly offset by the number of people urban 
assistance projects actually reached out to. 
 Furthermore, Cohen (2015, 67) says that aid and development agencies usually focus on 
measuring “outputs” instead of “outcomes.” In his own words, outputs account for “whether 
money was spent, whether the school was built, or whether the water supply network was 
constructed” and outcomes correspond to “whether the students attending the school were well-
educated or whether the water improved the health status of people using the network.” He 
summarizes his explanation by saying that “outputs can be defined as the physical and financial 
results generated by a project, while an outcome is the consequence of that output.”  
 Looking back at Parcelles Assainies, a sites-and-services project funded in 1972 by the 





disagreements, and an overall “stigma of failure” (74) among the bank employees made them 
evaluate it as a real failure. Nevertheless, after conducting an assessment of the same area in 
2006, the author observed a few facts that led him to contest the verdict made in the past by the 
World Bank. For instance, he noted that the settlement density had increased from 350 people 
per hectare to between 1,000 and 1,700 people per hectare5 and many plots were sold from low-
income residents to more affluent people. UN-Habitat says that high densities and overcrowding 
are a sign of slums and should be addressed (see the beginning of this chapter for more detail). 
However, under Michael Cohen’s interpretation, density increase in Parcelles Assainies might be 
an actual indicator of the project’s success, for it signals that dwellers in Dakar massively turned 
to this serviced and relatively well-located area as the decades went by. Also under this rationale, 
Cohen sees the possible gentrification of the area as an indicator that it became popular and, as I 
see it, that market forces of supply and demand fully acted in the serviced settlement. 
 At this point, I should make two important observations. Firstly, I am not implying that 
gentrification is neither a positive nor a desired outcome in upgraded settlements. As I will 
explain in depth in Chapter 6, this is exactly the opposite ideal scenario in São Paulo’s favelas. I 
am citing Cohen’s findings not because of this specific Senegal assessment, but actually because 
I believe that his explanation and further illustration of the difference between “outputs” and 
“outcomes” in urban assistance assessments comes in handy for favela-upgrading evaluations.  
Secondly, SEHAB and other housing departments across Brazil are not aid or 
development agencies. But the critique that applies for the latter group of organizations under 
Cohen’s article may be also true for the former set of institutions. By saying it, I mean that if the 
                                               
5 For the sake of comparison, India’s largest slum, Dharavi, has a density of somewhere between 1,500 and 5,000 





São Paulo Housing Department keeps assessing its upgrading success by counting the number of 
delivered housing units or by counting the decrease in the city’s housing deficit, this department 
may actually be focusing on an output rather than on an outcome. The desired outcome in this 
case relates more to Turner’s use values (see Chapter 7), or, in other words, to how residents 
subjectively assess their gains in wellbeing after the upgrading works. 
 Therefore, it became clear that different and innovative approaches were needed. In cities 
throughout Brazil, these new ways of handling housing issues spilled over to the fields of urban 
legislation, zoning, and, as mentioned, infrastructural provision. Cities like Recife and Diadema 
implemented in the 1980s and 1990s pieces of legislation that aimed at regularizing tenure and 
urban conditions of their settlements (Zuquim 2012). São Paulo innovated by implementing its 
1989-1992 Favela-Upgrading Program (ibid.) in a way that was designed similarly to the city’s 
current upgrading program (i.e. with a focus in consolidating most residences by servicing them, 
rather than by demolishing them and relocating dwellers to new housing units in other plots of 
land). 
 The impact of upgrading practices in the past has been deemed problematic in terms of 
scale, cost recovery, tenure security guarantees, and bureaucracy. That led to the aforementioned 
housing policy changes in Brazil and also to different approaches in institutions such as the 
World Bank. Michael Cohen (2001) explains that this agency shifted its focus to building up the 
capacity of local institutions (e.g. municipal and metropolitan governments) that deal with urban 
assistance issues on a regular basis. 
 Scholars such as Turner wrote extensively before upgrading shifted from mostly housing 





initiatives as housing. Nevertheless, when it comes to Turner, he demonstrates that there is a lot 
of room for the consideration of issues that bypass physical sheltering.   
 That brings us to the first question. As shall be explained in more detail in Chapter 7, 
Turner (1976) identifies two sets of values within housing: market values and human values. 
While the former group is easily quantifiable by monetary assessments, the latter—which relates 
to subjective and abstract considerations, such as physical dwelling standards and tenure 
security—is not easily measured and, even when some kind of quantitative assessment is 
conducted, different evaluators may reach different conclusions. 
 The key point that should be considered for this analysis is that any attempt of measuring 
the outcomes of upgrading in Brazil and elsewhere may not be a precise procedure. Having said 
that, scholars and practitioners who have delved into this kind of attempt have pointed to 
important components that may boost the success of upgrading programs. One of them is policy 
continuity. For instance, Magalhães and Di Villarosa (2012) emphasize the need for local 
governments to incorporate and institutionalize their upgrading policies. By doing that, local 
jurisdictions can make specific initiatives outlast isolated administrations. In the long run, those 
long-lived policies may allow for upgrading to be scaled up. 
 The problem within this strategy is that, when a mayor is replaced with his or her 
successor in many—if not all—Brazilian cities, local policy strategies completely change. That 
was felt by public officials in São Paulo on many occasions and was their fear after Mayor 
Fernando Haddad (2013-2017) lost his reelection bid. A SEHAB officer told me by then 






We sustain this discourse that says that housing policies do not depend on the administrations. 
But we know that, inevitably, when the administration [or the person in charge] changes, a few 
guidelines change, so you sometimes ... Some things are put aside, and new ones emerge.  
 
 This officer then mentioned that, for instance, there were in 2016—which was a local 
elections year—ideas of providing technical assistance to Sapé residents so that they would be 
able to build some of their much-needed new residences during the final stages of this 
settlement’s upgrading. However, she was afraid that, if the administration changed, all that 
would be “lost.” That was what in fact ensued (ibid.), as a new mayor stepped in and the 
implementation of the city’s upgrading policies were halted. 
 Another important issue that may lead to better accomplishments in upgrading programs 
is the capacity of policy makers to gather preliminary data on targeted communities. In São 
Paulo, social workers conduct surveys with residents of pre-upgrading favelas and compile the 
collected data—which mostly gravitates around the physical condition of dwellings, as well as of 
households’ socioeconomic information—into reports, which are sometimes called “Social Work 
Projects,” or Projetos de Trabalho Social and that guide decision making.  
If we look onto other upgrading cases around the world, we may learn that, besides 
gathering socioeconomic data of vulnerable residents, it is extremely important to map the 
settlements where these people live. Chatterji (2005) describes the difficulty that Indian officials 
have had to map Dharavi’s households and to conduct censuses in this, which is one of Asia’s 
largest slums. 6 According to the author (214), in this settlement, “[u]nfinished housing projects, 
                                               
6 Still according to Chatterji (2005) estimations indicate Dharavi’s population somewhere between 700,000 and 1.2 





high-rise buildings and huts with plastered brick walls and asbestos roofs co-exist side by side.”  
This extremely high density makes mapping a very complex endeavor in Dharavi, which adds up 
to its immense scale. SEHAB has carried out mapping efforts, which were made available on its 
Habitasampa platform. 
 It should be pointed out that the Indian context of slum upgrading and, more specifically, 
Dharavi’s one, may differ a lot from São Paulo’s context. To illustrate that, we should bear in 
mind that, while officials in Brazil’s largest city learned throughout the decades that it would be 
more feasible to service favelas and build limited on-site new housing there, in Mumbai, 
government officials learned with time that the best strategy to improve Dharavi would be 
redeveloping it piece by piece. Mukhija (2002, 553) defines slum redevelopment in Mumbai as 
“the demolition of existing slums and the redevelopment of new, higher density, medium-rise 
apartment blocks, including entirely cross-subsidized housing for the original slum dwellers,” 
which contrasts with the provided definitions for favela upgrading in this thesis. However, it is 
important to understand the major global context in which the improvement of slums can be 







3. Sapé and Real Parque: the Two Case Studies 
 
Sapé had the river ... It was a very shallow river, very shallow. When I arrived here, there were 
no shacks in front of the river. There were shacks, but very few. Then, [the years] went by and 
[Sapé] went on growing, growing, growing. ... The waterfront started to expand and there was a 
point in which there was nowhere to build anything. 
 
Débora, resident of Sapé interviewed in 2016 (Formicki 2018). 
 
In favelas, you buy [property] orally. Nobody sells on a piece of paper. 
 




The shacks were so close that, when seen from above, they looked like one single, 
irregular block. The gray zinc roofs sometimes overlapped; the wooden walls leaned on each 
other. The creek was a few inches away, but, when it rained, its putrid water was all over. Pipes 
hung from the walls of the brick shacks and sewage poured over the watercourse. And, crammed 
between the feeble walls and the stinky creek shores, piles of waste accumulated. 
 Five years later, these shacks did not exist anymore. Open spaces on both shores, about as 
wide as a two-lane street, had replaced the precarious residences. The upgrading works were 
going on, and an ambitious project was being implemented. A street that ran along the creek was 
being finished on the left bank and one linear park was supposed to be implemented on the right-
hand side. 
 Kids would play along the areas where houses once stood. There was a lot of sand and 





apartment blocks that had just been erected. Blue and white, red and white. Black window 
frames.  
 Favela do Sapé, in São Paulo’s West Zone (see Figure 7), was changing at a slow, but 
steady pace. It started as a settlement in the 1970s, a few decades after the favelas in São Paulo 
emerged. During my previous research fieldwork in 2016, a resident called Débora described the 
frequent floods that would periodically occur in pre-upgrading Sapé: “My house was on the 
waterfront. I lived [there for] 26 years. I experienced floods. I experienced floods that my stove, 
the water would cover it. I experienced floods [so] that I lost everything” (Formicki 2018).  
Sapé is a typical favela in São Paulo. It is built on squatted land, most of which is public. 
Before its upgrading, it was physically precarious and housed a vulnerable population, which 
stood out to the Housing Department significantly enough so that the department chose to 
prioritize the upgrading of this favela in the Gilberto Kassab mayoral administration (2006-
2013). 
As seen in Figure 1, many residences in Favela do Sapé were built very close to or above 
the local creek. The Housing Department considers that such residences are in flood-risk areas 
and prioritizes their removals when carrying out upgrading works. Altogether, out of the 2,360 
families that lived in the area before the upgrading intervention, 450 were in a situation of risk.  
Other criterion that put many houses into the removals list was the material used in their 
construction. In Sapé, 9.8% of dwellings were originally made of wood (São Paulo 2008), which 
also renders them precarious. Residents of those houses were put on a housing provision list and, 
while they waited for a new unit, they were paid monthly amounts, labeled as social rent, or 





A few other indicators demonstrate the physical precarity of the pre-upgrading Sapé, as 
well as its level of informality. According to a SEHAB report (ibid.), 78.7% of households had a 
clandestine electricity provision—which means that electrical cables that provided power were 
either illegally originating from streetlamps or from some other type of forbidden connection—
and 61.7% of households were clandestinely connected to the public water network. Alarmingly, 




Figure 1. Sapé before the start of upgrading. 
Source: SEHAB. 
 
In terms of social vulnerability, Sapé’s average household income before its upgrading 





currency conversion. Figure 2 shows the income levels of this favela’s households in 2008. It 
should be stated that SEHAB considers a family as socially vulnerable when it does not have 
enough income to pay basic expenses such as rent or condominium fees, and also when it has 
many members, especially children or elderly. 
 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of family income in Sapé in 2008 (in minimum wages - MW). 
Source: São Paulo 2008. 
 
By 2017, when the upgrading works were over,7  the waterfront had changed once again. 
The new avenue was already built, along with the new sewage infrastructure, 462 housing units, 
and other interventions such as the construction of sports courts and a bike lane. However, a few 
                                               
7 To be precise, only the first phase of the upgrading works of Sapé are finished. A new bid will be done for the 





of the displaced dwellers were still waiting to be rehoused, which by then might occur in a 
nearby plot of land. As of May 2019, residents are still to see their final relocation. 
The upgrading financing of Sapé was conventionally public. As I will better explain in 
Chapter 7, 3 different funds provided money for the works: (1) FUNDURB (Urban Development 
Fund), (2) FMSAI (Municipal Sanitation and Infrastructure Fund) and (3) PAC (Growth 
Acceleration Program). All three sources put together provided R$ 160,545,247.63, or US$ 
40,752,002.93, as of the May 2019 currency conversion (São Paulo 2013; São Paulo 2015(a); 
São Paulo 2015 (b); São Paulo 2016; São Paulo 2017; São Paulo 2018). That amount 
corresponds to R$ 67,970.05 invested per household, or US$ 17.253,18. 
 
3.2 Real Parque 
Seen from the Real Parque Housing Complex, the newest and most popular corporate 
region of São Paulo seems peaceful and even secondary to the city’s morning rush. The glass 
towers timidly reflect off the turbid, smelly waters of the Pinheiros River. The iconic cable-
stayed bridge that connects the two riverbanks are inconspicuously lit by the morning sun. Apart 
from the heavy traffic jamming the Marginal Pinheiros Expressway—and from eventual honks 
from motionless vehicles—, the Brooklin neighborhood8 always sits calmly in its place.  
 Across the watercourse, the apartment buildings of Real Parque,9 in Morumbi District 
(see Figure 7) had a favorable view of Brooklin. This social housing complex was located on the 
                                               
8 Brooklin was developed as a result of the Água Espraiada Urban Operation (AEUO), which was established in 
2001 and which thus came after the Faria Lima Urban Operation (FLUO), from which Real Parque received funds. 
The establishment of AEUO signals that the surroundings of Real Parque had real-estate development potential, 
which started to be captured by FLUO’s implementation in 1995, as this Urban Operation was also implemented in 
the proximities to Brooklin (see Figure 5). More about the Faria Lima UO will be covered later in this chapter. 





east-looking side of a relatively high and steep hill. Real Parque reigned unchallenged in its 
favorable spot. 
 The first government intervention in Real Parque was under the Cingapura Program. This 
favela, which was built along the Marginal Pinheiros Expressway, faced its intervention around 
2000 and, by this year, had 208 families awaiting to be rehoused (Moraes 2000).  
 After the implementation of the Cingapura Project, physical precarity and social 
vulnerability kept as a conspicuous sign for city officials. Pictures taken by SEHAB show houses 
very close to each other and in irregular grids (see Figure 3). Marlene, who I interviewed in 
January, 2019, described the situation that her and other pre-upgrading residents went through 
until the beginning of the works. She told me that the City Hall built a provisional lodging 
accommodation for the Cingapura works in the 1990s. After the delivery of the first units, many 
families occupied what had become abandoned accommodations. “We lived with rats,” she told 
me. According to her, residents would even install mosquito nets below the ceiling above their 
beds so that these rats would not fall over people asleep. Marlene also explained that the 
occupation would have no power, that its toilets would be always clogged, and that the overall 
environment would always be dirty.  
In the meantime, some fires took place in the remaining area of the Favela Real Parque. 
Eventually, the lodging place itself would burn into flames. After this event, which took place in 





process. As a preparation for the works, a study and registration of settlers had already been done 
in 2008. 10 
This study showed that families earned mostly between R$ 415.00 and R$ 830.00 each 
month (see Figure 4). That is a range between about US$ 105.34 and US$ 210.68. Also, as 
Marlene explained to me, tenure security did not exist in Real Parque. According to her, “in 
favelas, you buy [property] orally. Nobody sells on a piece of paper.” 
 The second round of interventions in Real Parque finally started shortly after, in 2010, as 
its first residences were acquired by eminent domain and demolished. This time, the city 
program that guided these interventions was labeled Favela-Upgrading Program. This upgrading 
plan envisaged the construction of 1,127 housing units in the area. Those units were erected over 
the demolished shacks. Lastly, the Cingapura complex was preserved. 
 
                                               
10 The part of this Real Parque study to which I had access is not as complete as the study done in Favela do Sapé. 
Regarding the former settlement, I could not figure out data on the types of water and electricity connection, nor 










Sources: SEHAB and Diagonal. 





Favela do Real Parque’s upgrading was a one-off case. Within the last decade, the São 
Paulo City Hall has been adopting a type of intervention that does not replace all original favela 
residences by new apartment units. As explained in the previous chapter, favela upgrading in São 
Paulo now implies providing settlements with infrastructure—such as sewage collectors—, new 
streets and improved alleys, and public facilities. Clearances are kept to a minimum number and 
only those residents who are in insalubrious places—such as areas of flood and/or landslide 
risk—or whose homes are on the way of the works are removed and provided with new housing 
units. 
Real Parque’s uniqueness might be explained by its funding model. As previously 
mentioned, differently than Sapé, Real Parque received funding from a major urban 
redevelopment scheme, called Urban Operation, or Operacão Urbana Consorciada. This 
settlement was close to the perimeter in which this operation was effective (see Figure 5). UOs 
are land-value capture mechanisms, which means that they allow the São Paulo city government 
to recover investments initially made in the redevelopment perimeter by charging developers for 
the increase in land value observed in this area after those investments. 
In the case under scrutiny, the City Hall invested in an anchor project, which was the 
extension of a major avenue, called Faria Lima. The government also established a perimeter 
around this avenue, in which zoning rules were changed so to allow for the construction of extra 
Floor Area Ratio (FAR). This additional area would only be effectively built by developers if 
they paid a money compensation, called CEPAC (Certificate of Additional Construction 
Potential). This compensation is sold in the city Stock Exchange as bonds and can be sold in the 
secondary market as well, with brokerage firms acting as intermediaries. The amount that the 





Urban Operation perimeter. In the case of Faria Lima Urban Operation, the collected money 
went to favela upgrading and to investments in a subway station, among other destinations (see 
Table 1). The amount of favela-upgrading resources invested per household was R$ 304,717.45, 
or US$ 77,369.28. 
 
 In Reais (R$) In Dollars (US$) 
Amount Collected 2,460,935,106.00  624,843,728.09 
Amount Invested (All 
Works) 
1,898,897,309.81  482,139,521.45 
Amount Invested in Real 
Parque’s Upgrading Works 
 338,236,365.91  85,879,904.49 
Final Balance  562,037,796.19  142,704,206.64 
Table 1. Amounts collected and invested in Faria Lima Urban Operation (1995-2019). 
Source; São Paulo 2019. 
 
Figure 5 locates Real Parque and its two closest Urban Operations (Faria Lima and Água 
Espraiada) in São Paulo. The point of this map is to show that the surroundings of this favela are 
areas with development potential, which started to be captured in 1995 with the establishment of 
Faria Lima Urban Operation and which went on with the further establishment of Água 
Espraiada Urban Operation, in 2001. The reason for these UOs to be set up in this area was 








Figure 5. Real Parque and Urban Context 
Source: São Paulo City Hall and Google Earth. Map by the author. 
 
 
Figure 6 is a map that schematically locates Sapé and Real Parque in São Paulo’s urban 
rings. The first one is the Historical Center and the Expanded Center, which are older and 
wealthier areas, which concentrate most jobs, infrastructure, and cultural facilities. The 
intermediary ring, which is where both favelas are, has a mixture of development potential and 





ring, real-estate values are lower than it the older urban ring, and thus show a potential for 
increase. The outer ring corresponds to the peripheral areas of the entire Metropolitan region. 
Most of Greater São Paulo’s squatter and vulnerable settlements are in this ring (see more in 
Mautner 1999 and in the previous chapter).  
It is important to say that, although they have many urban features in common, those 
rings are not uniform. There are favelas and other squatter and vulnerable settlements (such as 
tenements) in the inner rings, and one can also find pockets of wealth in the outer ring. 
Table 2 is a comparison between Real Parque and Sapé given their original settings. 
Figure 7 locates Sapé and Real Parque in São Paulo City and highlight the distribution of the 







Figure 6. Sapé, Real Parque, and their Location in Greater São Paulo (Scheme). 
Source: Google Earth and São Paulo State. Map by the author. 
 
 Real Parque Sapé 
Original Number of 
Households 
1,110 2,362 
Original Population 3,697 7,598 
District Morumbi Rio Pequeno 
Location Specificities High-income area Middle-class area 
Table 2. Initial comparison between Sapé and Real Parque 







Figure 7. Favelas in São Paulo.  





4. Infrastructure Provision as the Core of Favela Interventions 
 
“I lived by the creek . . . When it rained, we wouldn’t sleep  
fearing that the water would take away our house stilts.” 
 
Marlene, Real Parque resident. 
 
“Nowadays, we don’t feel ashamed to receive people.” 
 
Fátima, Sapé resident 
 
 
 When an urban planner or policymaker from São Paulo conjures the expression “favela 
upgrading,” he or she might think of housing and infrastructure provision, a bigger outreach of 
public services to affected settlements, as well as land regularization. More importantly, this 
professional might declare the upgrading successful based on ways of measuring these four 
components. In fact, practitioners and scholars may define favela upgrading as interventions that 
comprise 
 
infrastructure elements, housing provision and social facilities so that the settlement can be 
incorporated into the city, and often [include] urban mobility elements, such as elevators and 
cable cars. Today it is understood that the process only becomes effective with the settlement’s 






 The São Paulo City government lists as the goals of its Favela-Upgrading Program the (1) 
the transformation of these settlements and irregular subdivisions into “neighborhoods,” which 
includes asphalt, basic sanitation, street lighting, and public services, (2) the resettlement of 
families when they are in risk-prone areas (i.e. floodplains or landslide areas), (3) the recovery 
and preservation of environmentally-protected areas in the surroundings of Guarapiranga and 
Billings dams, and (4) housing improvements (São Paulo 2017). 
 Remoção and partial-clearance approaches are tied to different types of upgrading 
schemes which have recently been adopted in São Paulo. The former approach is usually adopted 
in Urban Operations, while the latter goes with conventional public funding. There are two 
possible reasons for this association.  
 The first relates to the interest that real-estate developers have for urban areas within the 
perimeters of these operations. As Fix (2009, 3) explains, there is a “reasonable” interest on the 
real-estate market’s end to invest in these areas, which tend to be in “already-privileged” urban 
areas. As Paulo, a member of SECOVI-SP (Union of Companies of Purchasing, Selling, Renting, 
and Administration of Residential and Commercial Properties of São Paulo State) explained to 
me, “you have to carry out an urban intervention in places that minimally have some real-estate 
appeal. Otherwise nothing happens.” Because private investors and developers show more 
interest in areas of Urban Operations and because those areas have a bigger potential for further 
development and for land and property values appreciation, the appetite to carry out more intense 
transformations (i.e. complete favela clearances) is higher in this case.  
 Morumbi, which is the upscale district where Real Parque is located, is an appealing area 





Parque. Favela do Sapé, on the other hand, is in the Rio Pequeno District, which is a middle-
class area where one does not see many luxury developments. 
 The second reason for the association is the fact that Urban Operations usually attract 
more funding than conventional upgrading (see Table 4 in Chapter 7). Therefore, it is possible to 
carry out complete clearance, which is more costly than partial clearance. 
 The aim of this chapter is to compare the upgrading outcomes of Real Parque and Sapé 
when it comes to the provision of infrastructure and public services.  
 
 Typically, upgraded favelas are provided with paved streets, basic sanitation, street 
lighting, and water and electricity provision. In this sense, both Sapé and Real Parque underwent 
major transformations. 
 In Sapé, the upgrading project envisaged the implementation of a major sewage network, 
as well as the formal provision of piped water and electricity, which was accomplished. 
Additionally, the creek that cuts through the settlement was channeled and a street was paved 
alongside it. A few improvements on alleys—such as their paving or the installation of steps on 
them—were also implemented. Figure 8 allows for an analysis of the major spatial 
transformations that this favela underwent. In 2017, the creek becomes apparent after its 
floodplain was cleared. The street on its western shore is also visible, as well as some open 






Figure 8. Satellite images of Sapé in 2005 (before upgrading) and in 2017 (after upgrading)..  





 Figure 8 allows for a comparison between the spatial arrangements of the creek’s 
immediate floodplain before this favela’s upgrading works started—which was around 2011—
and after they ended—in 2017. It is possible to see on Figure 9 the extremely precarious 
conditions of the residences built over the floodplain before the upgrading works, as well as the 
channeled creek and Sapé’s main street —built during the works. Although spatial and sanitary 
conditions visibly improved, residents have complained about the current state of abandonment 
that they witness alongside the creek. One of their main complaints is about the presence of the 
growing vegetation, which has not been taken care of by the City Hall. Figure 10 shows one 
alley in 2019. It is interesting to notice the formal power cables, installed after the upgrading 
works. Nevertheless, as is the case for all alleys in Sapé, no street lighting has been implemented. 
Real Parque also witnessed major transformations. Telma, who moved into Real Parque 
49 years ago and who remains there after the upgrading works, told me that the area was a vast, 
empty, and unserviced lot when she arrived. There was no sewage collection, no piped water, 
and no electricity provision. Whenever she needed water, Telma would fill up buckets at the sink 
of a nearby school. For lighting, she would use kerosene lamps or candles.  
Figure 11 compares Real Parque seen from above in 2008—before the start of the 
works—and in 2018—after they ended. It is important to notice that the housing condominiums 
on the Southeastern border of the community were not part of the upgrading assessed in this 
thesis. These buildings were erected in the late 1990s and house 243 families (Moraes 2000). 
One can also see that all shacks were replaced by condominiums and that streets were opened 







Figure 9. Sapé creek before upgrading (above) and after the works (below). 
Sources: SEHAB and the author. 
 






Figure 10. Alley in Sapé after completion of upgrading.  
Source: the author. 
 
 Real Parque also received sewage collectors, piped water, and electricity. Street lighting 
was also installed. Figure 12 is a shot taken from above the settlement right before the start of the 
works in 2010. The built density of the favela stands out. Figure 13 depicts the current state of 








Figure 11. Satellite images of Real Parque in 2008 and 2018.  






Figure 12. Real Parque before the upgrading works.  
Source: SEHAB. 
  
To end this chapter, we can conclude that both Sapé and Real Parque received a 
comprehensive coverage of sewage collection, piped water, and electricity. New streets and open 
spaces were also added to these communities. Infrastructure provision, which is now one of the 
core elements of upgrading, seems to be taken seriously by city officials. And residents did not 
complain about its quality neither in Sapé nor in Real Parque. Nevertheless, as shall be better 
discussed in Chapter 6, one should compare the benefits of having favela residents receive 
regular services to the increase in the cost of their bills. In other words, by formalizing urban 
services in favelas with the implementation of infrastructure, residents may gain in service 







Figure 13. Real Parque’s inner area in early 2019.  






5. Public Services and Safety: Secondary Objectives 
 
“Nobody bothers me. This is a place where I am well-known.” 
 
Marlene, Real Parque resident. 
 
“[The police] don’t want to know who is a criminal and who is not.” 
 
Telma, Real Parque resident 
 
 When I asked Fátima—who has lived in Sapé for over 30 years—about the reasons for 
her engagement in bringing a residents’ association to Sapé, she replied that “it [the residents’ 
association] will be very good to Sapé. Because it will get many teenagers out of the streets.” 
When inquired about the outreach of public services in Sapé, both her and Nelson—another 
long-time resident—, explained that this favela was well serviced by surrounding health units 
and educational facilities before the upgrading. Nevertheless, there was a legitimate concern 
among the local community: decreasing the exposure of the youth to the “streets,” or, in other 
words, to idleness and to the dangers of urban violence. 
 Sapé’s future residents’ association may provide free courses to young community 
residents. According to Fátima, one of them will teach students how to become caregivers of 
elders. This initiative has been inspired by the mobilization of inhabitants of the Favela São 
Remo, which is another community in São Paulo’s West Zone. 
 Real Parque’s residents also told me that their community is well serviced by daycares 
and other educational facilities, some of which are public and some of which privately-led. The 





Unidade Básica de Saúde, or Basic Health Unit. There is a plot of land in the middle of Real 
Parque which is currently being held for the construction of this facility. As a Housing 
Department urban planner explained to me, an economic and bureaucratic hindrance came into 
play here. Part of the money collected by the Faria Lima Urban Operation was destined to fund 
institutional uses in Real Parque and originally included the health center. However, the agency 
that oversees Urban Operations in São Paulo—called SP Urbanismo—claimed that all the money 
had already been used to build sports courts and other community facilities—which correspond 
to currently empty institutional buildings. This meant that new resources would have to be 
allocated from elsewhere to build the health unit. 
 In Sapé, the original upgrading plan foresaw the construction of a public library, which 
will also have a computing center. Because of funding shortages, the library was not built 
(Formicki 2016). 
 When it comes to favela upgrading, the idea of providing communities with public 
facilities—such as daycares and health centers—and public services—such as regular garbage 
pickup—is advocated by many scholars, urban designers, and city officials. However, making 
this provision actually happen is far more complicated than conceiving it. As explained above, 
issues such as funding shortages have arisen in Sapé and in Real Parque and have undermined 
the construction of public facilities in these two areas. While these facilities have not yet been 
implemented in Sapé and Real Parque, residents have been engaging in their fight to either make 
designed facilities feasible or to create privately-led alternatives—such as the residents’ 
asscociation in Sapé. 
 Favela-upgrading plans in São Paulo, no matter their type of funding, usually do not 





same decided to research the impacts of upgrading in the perceived public safety of Sapé and 
Real Parque. I made this decision because violence has become a major issue in Brazilian cities 
and because favelas have usually been associated with crime. So, major interventions such as 
upgrading may—intentionally or not—change the power status quo in favelas and, resultingly, 
the way its social actors get involved with the promotion or fighting of violence (see Formicki 
2018). 
 17 Brazilian cities were within the 50 most violent cities in the world in 2017 (Seguridad, 
Justicia y Paz 2017). Drug gangs have played increasingly major roles in chunks of Brazilian 
urban territories and clashes between different criminal groups and between criminal groups and 
the police have made lethal violence levels in Brazil skyrocket in the recent years. Holston 
(2009, 15) explains that “they [criminal gangs] dominate a certain amount of territory in major 
cities with a rule that distributes summary execution along with diapers, milk medication, and 
employment, combining terror and public works.” When writing about Rio de Janeiro’s favelas, 
Perlman (2010, 165) explains that they are “appealing locations for the drug gangs, with their 
narrow, winding alleys, abundant hiding places, and unemployed youth.” These features are also 
found in São Paulo’s favelas.11 Maybe not as a coincidence, Sapé residents wanted to establish 
the already-mentioned youth facilities that would keep young favela residents out of the streets. 
 Another important feature that I noticed in Sapé and Real Parque was the informal system 
of solving small criminal incidences that happen in both favelas. In other words, if a resident is 
                                               
11 Nevertheless, Rio and São Paulo face different challenges when it comes to fighting urban violence. While Rio de 
Janeiro witnesses clashes between different drug gangs, militias, and the police, São Paulo has one major active 
gang and does not officially register the presence of militias. Clashes between criminals in São Paulo are also less 
common, due to the existence of what a few scholars call a “pax monopolista,” or induced truces imposed by 






robbed by someone who lives in their community, this resident can look for a local criminal gang 
operative and ask for their stolen objects to be returned. Fátima, from Sapé, told me: “I have 
never been [robbed], but I know people who have already been robbed at the bus stop. But then 
we fight, we run after. If [the robber] is from here, we figure this out, go talk to whom we have 
to talk.” Fátima also told me that “Robbing people from this area, we don’t accept this type of 
thing. And if [we] know [the robbers], we go after them.” This is the internal way of solving 
crime issues, which is talking to drug dealers, rather than calling the police. 12 
 Another issue that I noticed was that residents in Sapé and Real Parque are generally 
spared by criminals from their communities. Marlene, from Real Parque, explained to me that 
she is not targeted by local criminals: “Nobody bothers me. This is a place where I am well-
known.” 
 Both the informal justice system of Sapé and Real Parque and the mutual tolerance 
between many residents and local criminals point to a very specific web of relationships and of 
favela politics in those communities. Another important feature that can be brought up in this 
context is the extent of community cohesion and its relationship to criminal incidence. A social 
worker from Sapé explained to me that Fátima’s condominium had less issues with violence and 
drug dealing when compared to the other condominiums in Sapé. She believes that this is due to 
a higher level of community unity in Fátima’s apartment block. The social worker went on 
saying that, where the community ties are stronger, there is more vigilance and rules 
enforcement. 
                                               
12 In many favelas, there is a certain point in which drug dealers start controlling residents’ associations and run a 





 And how about the presence of the police in upgraded favelas? Although I did not 
specifically ask if patrolling had actually increased after the upgrading of Sapé and Real Parque, 
I did inquire if residents felt an increase in safety levels in their communities. I also asked 
interviewees about their overall impressions on policing in their favelas. 
 Telma, from Real Parque, showed the starkest criticism against the police and their 
actions. She told me that “[the police] don’t want to know who is a criminal and who is not.” 
According to her, many young people, as well as “family men and workers”13 are frequently 
searched by the police in Real Parque. She also told me that the police started to go after a few 
residents. They were coming armed to residences to search people, who are afraid of being 
beaten by the police. Lastly, she explained that the police make jokes on residents. Telma ended 
up by saying that “[t]he police protect but also threaten.” 
 Marlene, also from Real Parque, holds a neutral tone regarding the police. She has always 
felt safe in Real Parque—even before the upgrading works. Safety levels, according to her, have 
not changed in the community. She also told me that “Real Parque is a very good place to live. 
It’s close to everything” and has “many good people.”  
 Among all the Real Parque interviewees, Aparecida seemed to be the most positive one 
about the police. She assured me that there is more safety in the settlement now. She said that the 
police are there every day and that they have assisted residents. She illustrated by saying that 
criminals had recently robbed a long-time dweller, who was born in Real Parque. This dweller, 
                                               
13 Labeling people “workers” (or trabalhadores) is a way of symbolically opposing them to criminals (or bandidos). 
This is a common opposition that has been observed and studied by Brazilian scholars (see Feltran 2011 and 





who knew everyone in the community, asked police officers for assistance. They, who were 
patrolling the area, arrested the robbers.   
 In Sapé, the interviewees told me that safety levels either remained the same or improved 
after this settlement’s upgrading. Fátima was optimistic: “Sapé has already been dangerous. Now 
it is calm.” Nelson also had a rather positive tone. He told me that  
 
[safety] improved a little. There’s more trust. Because of the buildings [improved built 
environment]. And people’s conviviality improved. People are more understanding [of each 
other]. [Before] it was each to his own and God watching over everyone. Nobody respected 
anyone. Before no one would seat to talk to the others.” 
 
 One side effect of the upgrading in Sapé was the transformation of at least part of the 
group of residents into a more close-knit community. Maybe that fact played the biggest role in 
increasing levels of perceived safety for the interview respondents. This is a topic that surely 
deserves an upcoming future research. 
 To conclude this chapter, it is important to bear in mind that both settlements have seen 
an incomplete implementation of public services and facilities. This was not a major issue 
because the surroundings of both favelas were already well-serviced before their respective 
upgrading works. Nevertheless, in both cases, residents were coming together to secure the 
implementation of facilities they deemed important for their communities. It seems that the type 






 Regarding perceived safety levels, the same logic applies. The overall impression of the 
residents I talked to was that public safety levels either stayed the same or improved a little. 
Nevertheless, one unique element should be noticed in Sapé: the strengthening of at least part of 
the community, and the subsequent decrease in violence perceptions among members of this 
community group. Apart from this fact, my impression was that public services and safety 





6. Affordability: Can Favela Upgrading Address Economic Hardships? 
 
“It [the upgrading] has to be so well done  
that the resident will stay there and will not sell their apartment.” 
 




“We were not in this habit of paying those bills. It has become hard [to afford it].” 
 
Marlene, resident of a new housing unit in Real Parque community. 
 
 Aparecida, like many of her neighbors in Real Parque, was going through economic 
difficulties. An ageing widow, mother of two unemployed daughters and grandmother of two 
children, she had to take a tough yet by no means hesitating decision: to stop paying most of her 
bills in order to assist her family. In a serene tone, Aparecida explained to me her situation: “I’m 
not paying because I don’t have conditions to pay… I’m not going to pay a City Hall bill and let 
my kids starving.” 
 Marlene, another resident from Real Parque, told me on that same day that people who 
lived in the community before it was upgraded were not in the habit of paying so many bills. In 
early 2019, when I talked to her, she and her husband were unemployed. In order to make some 
money, Marlene was about to open a bar in the community. This initiative would consist of a 
wooden cubicle, erected over the sidewalk of one Real Parque street. 
 Aparecida and Marlene’s difficulty in paying their bills came from an apparently positive 
fact: they, who had previously lived in Favela do Real Parque, now inhabited the Real Parque 





name; it was also a visually noticeable process. However, this accomplishment had a negative 
side on the lives of its beneficiaries: they would now have to pay for expenses that they had 
never had before. After moving in to newly-built apartments, Real Parque residents were now 
facing condominium installments and maintenance fees, as well as charges for water, electricity, 
and gas consumption.  
 Aparecida told me that her monthly living expenses—which included the apartment 
installment, condominium fee and bills—would reach an amount between 300 and 400 reais. 
But, according to her, some families paid as much as 1,000 reais. Almost 40% of Real Parque’s 
original population—the ones who inhabited the pre-upgrading favela—earned between 415.00 
and 830.00 reais per month in 2008, as Figure 4 in Chapter 3 shows. These amounts correspond 
to 1 and 2 minimum wages. For a family that earned 1 ½ monthly minimum wage (622.50 reais 
in 2008), the 350-reais expense would be equivalent to 56.22% of their monthly income.14 This 
income commitment does not include other family expenses, such as food, clothing, internet 
bills, and leisure.  
 Because it does not consider inflation throughout the years, this calculation is a simplified 
estimation of the extent to which many inhabitants of low-income settlements commit their 
earnings. Nevertheless, it might be suggestive of the financial challenges that many of those 
dwellers face to this day. As Aparecida also told me on that day, “I was never broke. Today, I 
want to go out with my grandchildren and do not have money.”  
  
                                               
14 Economists usually recommend that families do not commit more than 25-30% of their monthly income with 





 Scholars usually praise initiatives that reduce the number of removed houses in upgraded 
favelas. Many of them argue that displacements, even if temporary, change the dynamics of 
communities by usually breaking social connections of deep-rooted families. Also, the money 
compensation that the São Paulo City Hall offers favela residents is usually low and does not 
allow families to move into a dwelling in a better or similar condition.  
 In fact, if residents compare the compensation value of a shack or precarious residence in 
a non-upgraded favela to the sales value of the same house in an upgraded area or to the amount 
that a newly-built apartment is worth in upgraded communities, they will conclude that accepting 
to move in to a new housing unit and then selling it is a better deal than simply receiving a 
definitive compensation to leave their house and find another housing situation by themselves. 
Marlene told me that the São Paulo City Hall would offer 8,000 reais to pre-upgrading Real 
Parque residents who were willing to receive cash immediately and then look for other houses on 
their own. She went further by explaining that, on the other hand, those who waited to move to 
new apartments and later sold their units—which is nonetheless illegal—charged about 80,000 
reais for the transaction. 
 This fact points to the need of different ways to assess the efficacy of favela-upgrading 
programs. I believe that affordability is an essential component that allows for a comprehensive 
analysis of this efficacy. To me, a successful upgrading program—either if it consists of 
providing a few new housing units, or if it is based on complete clearances and subsequent on-
site rehousing—is also defined by the number of families that are able to remain living in the 
upgraded community provided that they will face an increase in monthly expenditures. Although 





examples of economically-troubled residents that may not be able to afford living in upgraded 
Real Parque for too long. 
 Naturally, upgrading advocates will fairly claim that favela-upgrading programs do not 
cause lack of affordability and that they are actually affected by the fragilized livelihoods of 
countless favela residents. While it is true, it is also true that upgrading programs can offset 
community residents’ economic hardships by generating jobs and income among them. 
 Upgrading interventions in São Paulo are usually classified as housing policies. Is it not a 
coincidence that these interventions are under the responsibility of the city’s Housing 
Department (SEHAB). Nevertheless, there is a growing institutional understanding in Brazil that 
upgrading can and should generate local economic development—here defined by the creation of 
income and jobs among favela residents. The federal government’s Handbook of Technical and 
Social Orientation (COTS), which is a series of guidelines for the implementation of social work 
in upgrading programs in municipal and state jurisdictions that are being funded by the Union, 
explains that 
 
the implementation of the Technical and Social work favors the correct appropriation and use of the 
implemented systems/improvements, through activities of informative and educational character, seeking 
the social mobilization and participation through the dissemination of information … as well as through 
the economic-financial improvement of the community, with actions aimed at generating income. 
(Brazil 2004, 4, emphasis added). 
 
 The document goes on by saying that “[t]he Technical and Social Work is the group of 





environmental education, professional capacitation and/or work and income generation.” 
(Brazil 2004, 5, emphasis added). 
 SEHAB carried out a few attempts to put those guidelines into practice. One of those 
attempts took place in Real Parque, where approximately 70 retail spaces were built to host 
commercial and institutional uses. This space was reserved to residents of the pre-upgrading 
community. A social worker from the Housing Department told me that there were more than 
100 informal retail spaces in Favela do Real Parque, which means that at least 30 local 
merchants were not contemplated with commercial space in the later condominium. An urban 
planner also from SEHAB explained to me that some merchants were not assigned with retail 
space because they carried out activities—such as recycling—that were not adequate with the 
mostly residential condominium activities of Real Parque or that would require special structures 
that the City Hall could not build. 
 SEHAB granted the retail space to residents in a lease system based on a contract called 
“Use Permission Agreement” (TPU). This agreement would establish a lease system according 
to which the space would not become property of its occupiers, who therefore would not be able 
to sell it. 
 The retail space was built on the first level of two outside streets of Real Parque 







Figure 14. Retail space in Real Parque as its construction was almost over.  
Source: SEHAB. 
 
 Regulating and supervising the way residents would run the retail space proved to be a 
difficult endeavor for city officials. Their biggest problem related to which public agency would 
be responsible for the regulation of the commercial area in Real Parque. It was never clear which 
agency had this legal responsibility, as, initially, the Supply Supervision agency (ABAST, in its 
Portuguese acronym) was supposed to set the occupancy rules and, afterward, another agency—
the City Labor and Entrepreneurship Department—claimed responsibility for this duty. Another 
drawback regarding the management of the retail space in Real Parque was how to enforce the 
occupancy rules set within the TPU. Local drug traffickers opposed to the presence of city 





way that the management of this area turned out to be. According to her, all the social work done 
in the lead up to the grant of the retail space was lost in a “very sad” outcome. 
 When it comes to Favela do Sapé, although its upgrading project never included official 
retail areas for local merchants, some independent initiatives can be seen in this regard. Nelson, 
who is a long-time resident of this community, is one of the few but persistent dwellers who run 
commercial establishments in the area. Owner of a small groceries store in the residual area (see 
Figure 15), he told me the following: “As far as I’m concerned, garage and commercial spaces 
should not be built, because they [city officials] would not permit it … Even so, I decided to do 
it. Because, if I didn’t do it, others would.” Nelson’s testimony points to problems of law 
enforcement also in Sapé. 
 Marlene’s plans to erect an informal bar on one Real Parque’s street also touches on the 
commercial-use matter. Running a bar or groceries store, no matter how diminutive the space 
might be, many times corresponds to a feasible alternative of income generation—and, 
depending on the establishment’s size, of jobs creation as well. Thus, it is important that the City 
Hall can provide such types of spaces in upgraded favelas, as it is equally important that city 
officials are able to regulate and inspect them. 
 At the time of this writing, the macroeconomic scenario of Brazil is marred by a fiscal 
crisis that has led to low employment. The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics 
(IBGE) disclosed that, in November 2018, the unemployment rate in the country was 11.6%. The 
same report claimed that many of the employed Brazilians were working in the informal sector 
(G1 2018). Naturally, the creation of retail spaces for residents of upgraded favelas will not 
affect the larger macroeconomic scenario in Brazil. However, the availability of such space—as 





in these communities. And they can be a last-resource alternative for many residents who cannot 
afford their bills. 
 After all, the success of an upgrading program also has to be assessed through the lens of 
residents’ affordability, income, and jobs generation. Because the upgrading program will be 
useless if the vulnerable population it actually targets ends up excluded from its outcomes. As 
one SEHAB urban planner told me, “[t]here should be a combined operation: you carry out the 
works and you implement a way of having residents improve their income in a way that they can 
remain there.” Because, as she goes on saying, “[i]f he [the resident of an upgraded favela] 
doesn’t have income, he may go away and sell out everything.” 
 
Figure 15. Nelson’s groceries store in Favela do Sapé.  






 Housing scholars have engaged in discussions about possible ways to have poor urban 
residents generate wealth under conditions such as the ones Nelson, Marlene, and Aparecida 
found themselves in before the upgrading of their settlements. Hernando de Soto (2000) is 
famously known for arguing that property documents—or title deeds—are an efficient way under 
which poor urbanites can “represent their property and create capital (6-7).” In other words, he 
argues that, by receiving titles for the land they have been occupying for years, these people can 
convert their informal assets into active capital and, thus, trigger economic cycles of prosperity.  
 In fact, the concession of land tenure may enable poor urban settlers to obtain some 
economic leverage in their countries. However, Soto’s claim that “most of the poor already 
possess the assets they need to make a success of capitalism (5)” is contested by other scholars. 
Davis (2004, 25), for instance, makes the point that the poor are immersed in an informal 
conjuncture—which relates to housing, but also to labor—not because of gridlocked property 
rights, but actually because capitalism itself marginalizes them and “let[s] them with no choice 
but to subsist by some means or starve.”    
 After all, as one of the upgrading designers of Sapé told me in 2016, informality was a 
major obstacle for settlers to be accepted into municipal social housing schemes. She explained 
that, because economic and bureaucratic15 stability was sometimes absent in many households, 
they could not be included into COHAB (São Paulo City Housing Company) housing provision. 
Nevertheless, the question to be posed here is: to which extent is housing informality a problem 
and to which extent can it be a feasible—maybe the only feasible—way of life?  
                                               
15 “Bureaucratic” stability here means the ability of families or households to be satisfy specific conditions in order 





 Formalizing services may be in the interest of the local government, as they oppose to 
clandestine provisions aim at collecting taxes. Nevertheless, as residents explained to me, the 
official bills that start to come after formalization are sometimes unaffordable. This should be 
kept in mind whenever this process is generically portrayed as desirable. Maybe formalization is 
desirable to the government, but it also may be unfeasible to vulnerable favela residents. 
  My field work has shown me that macroeconomic conditions—such as overall 
employment—are crucial in determining the fate of families in upgraded favelas, regardless of 
their land tenure status. Naturally, providing them with land security is desirable, as it is an 
assurance against future displacement attempts. But if families do not have the overall economic 
means to cling to their properties, their deeds will not guarantee their housing stability. This 
means that deeded families in upgraded favelas who cannot afford to remain in their improved 
communities will end up selling their property—even if it is an illegal procedure—and will move 
into non-upgraded communities, where land and property are cheaper and where there are no 
deeds. In sum, the formalized housing market in favelas may outprice the poor. 
 Based on the qualitative primary material that I collected, a comparison between Sapé 
and Real Parque in terms of affordability, local economic development, and tenure security leads 
to a few takeaways, which I summarize below: 
 
(1) As explained in this chapter, macroeconomic conditions, which do not depend on 
the type of upgrading, are very important in determining if residents will be able to afford 





(2) Because Real Parque was entirely rebuilt—as part of a remoção or removal 
model—, all of its residents faced a significant appreciation in the value of their 
dwellings. In Sapé, not all residents witnessed such a significant rise in the value of their 
properties, as many houses were kept. This may indicate that not all Sapé residents faced 
the same outside pressure or temptation to sell their units, while this must have been the 
case for Real Parque dwellers. One may conclude that removals, followed by on-site 
rehousing, lead to a higher appreciation in the market value of dwellings and, thus, to 
additional external pressure for residents to sell their units. 
(3) In terms of income generation through the creation of retail spaces, Real Parque 
initially seemed to lead to more of these opportunities than Sapé, where commercial units 
were neither built in the condominiums nor allowed to be established in the reminiscent 
area. However, evidence from interviews show that the retail space in Real Parque did not 
work as originally planned. On the other hand, in Sapé, an organic and irregular 






7. Real Estate: Two Not So Different Stories 
 
“The immeasurability of use values is not in the least perturbing to the conventional capitalist. 
His value system can only admit the existence of market values in the sphere of commercial 
production, distribution and consumption.” 
 
Turner 1976, 65. 
 
“You have to carry out an urban intervention in places that minimally have some  
real-estate appeal. Otherwise nothing happens.” 
 
Paulo, representative of the São Paulo real-estate market. 
 
 In cities like New York, there seems to be an apparently endless antagonism between 
urban redevelopment and urban renewal on the one side and housing affordability on the other. 
While renewal attempts arguably reverse urban decay in some neighborhoods, the usual rezoning 
and the construction of developments that ensue in those neighborhoods can engender an 
increase in property and rent values that may ultimately displace their lower-income residents. 
Legal demands for a supply of affordable units in new developments thus comes as an important 
attempt to prevent gentrification.16 
 In São Paulo, large-scale urban redevelopment projects may also cause price hikes and 
therefore an economic pressure for less affluent dwellers to leave their neighborhoods or 
communities and seek a more affordable housing alternative elsewhere—which usually implies 
the city’s outskirts. Generally speaking, these urban redevelopment projects correspond to the 
                                               
16 Housing outpricing and gentrification in São Paulo are topics of utmost importance that deserve further 





Urban Operations, here understood as a set of publicly- and privately-led initiatives—which 
range from rezoning to the implementation of infrastructure—that support and incentivize 
private developments in the areas that the city government wants to redevelop. In São Paulo’s 
case, the designation of Special Zones of Social Interest (ZEIS)17 inside areas of Urban 
Operations or nearby is fundamental to tentatively keep poor residents in their neighborhoods. 
 The rationale behind urban redevelopment and urban renewal is that targeted areas will 
face a potential increase in their market values—because of the passing of incentivizing urban 
legislation, due to the construction of infrastructure, or both—and that it will attract private 
developers, who will invest in those areas and help increase local market values even more. John 
Turner (1976) wrote extensively about housing market values and their relationship with another 
inherent housing element: use vales.  
 Market housing values are monetary values assigned to dwellings. This type of value is 
quantifiable according to the amount of material standards—e.g. electricity, water, and sewer 
utilities—that residences comply with. Use values are human and social values assigned to the 
process of creation and maintenance of the housing stock. These values, that range from tenure 
security to the ability to save money out of rent and commuting in order to create betterment 
opportunities—are difficult to quantify and should not be measured based on market values 
(Turner 1976). 
 The upgrading interventions of Sapé and Real Parque have had different impacts on the 
market and use values of these settlements’ residents and of surrounding areas. I initially 
assumed that in Sapé use values went up—i.e. residents felt a decrease in physical precarity and 
                                               





felt more comfortably towards their houses and the public space surrounding them—, and that 
market values, at least in the surroundings of the favela, did not. On the other hand, I expected 
both values to have increased in Real Parque. My hypothesis was based on the premise that, 
because Real Parque is in an urban area that sparks more interest among developers, its 
upgrading might be significantly influential on engendering property-value appreciation in its 
surroundings, while the same could not be said about Sapé.   
 If confirmed, these facts would point to an important takeaway: that conventional 
upgrading did not engender too much gain for the official real-estate market—although favela 
residents might benefit from it—, while Urban Operations-backed upgrading, boosted by its 
more favorable location, can result in an appreciation scenario for dwellers—who would 
probably witness an increase in the use value of their residences—and in a favorable outcome for 
developers—since market values would tend to rise in the surroundings.  
 Nevertheless, in the case of the Faria Lima Urban Operation—of which Real Parque’s 
upgrading was part—market values in Morumbi District—where Real Parque is located—seem 
not to have been affected by this settlements’ upgrading works. Overall, it seems that the real-
estate activity in Morumbi and Rio Pequeno districts followed specific trends independently of 
the upgrading works of Real Parque and Sapé, respectively. Between 2008 and 2015, the price of 
the square meter in these two districts rose steadily (see Figure 16). It is important to notice that 
in both cases the property appreciation began before the start of the upgrading works. It is also 
important to realize that these rises in market values might have been tied to a general increase in 
market values in the entire city of São Paulo.  






Figure 16. Price of the square meter in São Paulo, Morumbi, and Rio Pequeno between 2008 and 2015.  
Source: FipeZap. 
 
 If market values in Morumbi did not increase in a higher proportion than that of the city 
of São Paulo, in Real Parque the story may have been different. As mentioned in Chapter 6, 
Marlene, who already lived in Real Parque before its upgrading, explained that a few apartments 
were being sold in the informal real-estate market by about 80,000 reais, while the City Hall had 
offered 8,000 reais for an average shack in the pre-upgrading community. That roughly indicates 
an appreciation of 1,000%. 
 My research also pointed to an increase in use values in Real Parque. Although both 
Marlene and Aparecida pointed to the poor finishing of their units—Aparecida, for instance, 
reproachfully showed me the loose floor of her living room—, they were very clear in stating the 





physical transformations in the settlement, said that she now found herself in a “dignified” 
housing situation, which is “better than a shack.” Because living conditions are experienced 
socially and are not precisely measurable by residents, they are closely tied to Turner’s use 
values definition.  
 When it comes to Favela do Sapé, use values also seem to have risen. Fátima, who moved 
to the community in the 1980s and who now lives in a new condominium there, told me that she 
believes that Sapé has improved. “Nowadays, we don’t feel ashamed to receive people,” she 
declared. Nelson, who also witnessed Sapé’s upgrading and who lives in one of this settlement’s 
residual areas, told me that Sapé has “improved a lot,” especially in its built environment, 
cleaning, and aesthetics. 
 Regarding market values in Sapé’s surroundings, Paulo, who represents the São Paulo 
real-estate developers in city councils, told me that he did not believe there was any increase due 
to the works in this favela. In fact, Figure 16 shows that, similarly to Morumbi, Rio Pequeno 
District’s market values seem to have followed the city overall rise trend.  
 A look at the number of residential developments in both districts (see Figure 17) 
between 2006 and 2016 points to an unsteady real-estate activity, which had its ups and downs 







Figure 17. Number of new vertical residential developments in Morumbi and Rio Pequeno in 2006 and 2016. 
Source: São Paulo City Hall. 
   
 Therefore, I conclude that the two favela-upgrading schemes have not engendered 
sensible market gains for the real-estate market that operates in Sapé’s and Real Parque’s 
surroundings. However, market values did rise significantly for these communities’ residents, 
who, in some cases, may have seen their properties appreciate about 1,000%. Use values have 
also accrued in the perception of dwellers. One way to read those conclusions is by 
acknowledging that the Urban Operations do not stand out from conventional upgrading when it 
comes to benefitting the real-estate market that operates around upgraded favelas. In fact, Paulo 
explained to me: “I do not see a significant relationship between favela upgrading and the real-
estate appreciation of the immediate surroundings [of upgraded favelas].” 
 So, what motivates developers to put money into Urban Operations? Santoro (2014) 
argues that land has increasingly been seen by the Brazilian capital market as a commercial 





market value. Santoro goes on by saying that this view has brought up serious consequences, 
such as income concentration and land values appreciation. She also argues that this restricts the 
use of urban land for not so profitable uses, such as social housing. These uses are usually 
associated with the enforcement of constitutional Brazilian rights, such as housing. 
 In fact, the real-estate market sees urban land as a good which can be profitable. As Paulo 
said, “the developer realizes that in a given territory he will have market for a given product.” 
The possibility to generate profit will especially come from the possibility that Urban Operations 
offer for developers to build an extra Floor Area Ratio (FAR) in specific areas that show a 
potential for value appreciation. This potentiality is boosted by infrastructure investments that 
governments have done in the Urban Operations areas, such as major avenues. Developers pay a 
compensation for the extra FAR and, thus, fund public projects in São Paulo—such as favela 
upgrading schemes. This compensation, called CEPAC (Certificate of Additional Construction 
Potential), consists of stock exchange bonds which developers can purchase. 
 Putting aside the Urban Operations’ outcomes—which Santoro pointed as socially 
restrictive—, it should be said that these operations come as an alternative funding source for 
urban projects that might benefit the public interest. 
 Because urban Operations do not receive budgeted resources, they are a rather self-
sustained scheme when compared to conventional, publicly-funded upgrading. Also, its funding 
scheme (triggered by CEPACs) potentially collects more resources than the public mechanism. 
Tables 3 and 4 explain in detail the funding sources of both Real Parque and Sapé’s upgrading, 






 Real Parque Sapé 
Part of an Urban 
Operation? 
Yes No 
Type of upgrading funding CEPACs FUNDURB, FMSAI, and 
PAC  
Table 3. Background of Real Parque and Sapé. 
Adapted from: Formicki 2016. 
 
 Conventional upgrading schemes are not funded by CEPACs, but, rather, by public funds 
and by another specific mechanism, called FUNDURB (or Urban Development Fund). This 
money source also comes from the purchase of additional building rights in the city (Santoro et 
al 2016). However, these rights are sold by the City Hall in areas that are not within Urban 
Operations’ perimeters. Therefore, they are not considered CEPACs. 
One particularity of CEPACs is that the money collected from their purchase can only be 
invested in Urban Operation areas or in areas that are nearby and specifically included in the 
Urban Operation scheme—like Real Parque. On the other hand, funds from generic additional 
rights (that go to FUNDURB) can be invested anywhere in the city. 
The selected case studies for this thesis are in distinct funding conjunctures. Real Parque 
was included in the Faria Lima Urban operation, while Sapé was not part of such type of scheme. 
As a consequence, Real Parque was upgraded with CEPAC resources and Sapé with public funds 
(namely, FUNDURB, PAC, and FMSAI). PAC is a federal program whose acronym stands for 







Type of funding Real Parque Sapé 
CEPACs R$ 338,236,365.91 (between 
1995 and 2019) (especially 
through the selling of 
additional building rights 
within UOs by the City) 
R$ 0.00 
FUNDURB R$ 0.00 R$ 1,471,242.26 (2015) 
R$ 3,963,455.72 (2016) 
R$ 3,244,329.36 (2017) 
total: R$ 8,679,027.34 
(through the selling of 
additional building rights 
outside of UOs by the City) 
PAC R$ 0.00 R$ 134,135,000.28 (between 
2009 and 2018) 
FMSAI R$ 0.00 R$ 17,731,220.01 
Total R$ 338,236,365.91 R$ 160,545,247.63 
Total per Household R$ 304,717.45 R$ 67,970.05 
Table 4. Comparison between funding mechanisms for upgrading of Real Parque and Sapé. 
Sources: São Paulo 2013; São Paulo 2015(a); São Paulo 2015 (b); São Paulo 2016; São Paulo 2017; São Paulo 2019; São 
Paulo 2018. 
 
 Paulo argued that the Urban Operation scheme is a “win-win” deal for the São Paulo city 
government and for developers. For this scheme to work like that—and for it to eventually be 
preferred by the municipal government and by real-estate developers when compared to the 
conventional type of upgrading, a few facts should take place. On the developers’ end, the price 
charged for CEPACs cannot be too high. Additionally, the civil construction market in São Paulo 





On the government’s side, more than obtaining the funding for favela upgrading has to be 
achieved. As shown in this and in previous chapters, issues such as guaranteeing housing 
affordability and some income generation for residents is key. 
 The real-estate sector might see housing as a commercial good—which is supposed to 
pay off and generate profit—and favela residents and government officials may see it as a 
process—which has to mostly provide quality. Are both views reconcilable? This might be a 
theme for further research. But, no matter the extent to which these views match, it is important 








“The vast majority of officials and professionals keep recommending the destruction of people’s 
homes in order to solve those same people’s ‘housing problems’ by providing them with 
alternatives either they or society cannot afford.” 
 
Turner 1976, 61. 
 
 
“There was an absence of a structured public housing policy [during Sapé’s upgrading]. Which 
I think we still do not have in the city. I think there is a Housing Plan, which is a relationship 
between demand and supply. [It should be] more than a drawing, more than a project of building 
systems, more than a project that relates communities to that place.” 
 




 There is no recipe for how to upgrade favelas. Nevertheless, there are a few items that 
should be considered by public officials and planners, as well as by urban and architectural 
designers. As explained in the second quote above, favela upgrading—and its assessment—is 
more than simply reducing the municipal housing deficit. It is a much more complex process, 
which I hope to have delved into in the previous chapters. 
As I mentioned in Chapter 1, this work enabled me to understand the rationale of 
upgrading schemes and the reality of the upgraded communities. I believe that this understanding 
exercise is key. 
 To make this statement more objective, let us revisit one issue that I brought up earlier in 
this thesis (for a summary of my findings, see Table 4). When it comes to providing communities 
with public facilities and social services, both the complete removal—or Urban Operations—and 





implement facilities such as daycares and health units. The São Paulo City Hall explicitly 
mentions that its Favela Upgrading Program aims at transforming vulnerable settlements into 
neighborhoods (see Chapter 4), with the implementation of public services in targeted 
communities. Also, as explained in Chapter 2, city administrations have attempted different 
types of favela interventions throughout the last decades. They learned by doing that social 
services and public facilities must be provided as part of the upgrading process. 
 Even so, as we saw, Sapé and Real Parque were not provided with some of the much-
needed facilities. From my two-year work experience with public officials at SEHAB, I can 
assert that they had the utmost interest in seeing this important upgrading element implemented. 
However, issues such as money shortages and bureaucracy played a role in preventing it from 
happening. 
 Thus, the current logic of upgrading failed in this sense. But a parallel reality, observed 
among Sapé and Real Parque residents, was fortunately emerging. Long-time dwellers from 
these communities are organizing to fill some left gaps and create one residents’ association in 
Sapé or watch out for the preservation of a land plot where officials had promised to build a 
health center. These residents’ agency is a reality that cannot be overlooked. Their organizing 
capacity is real and has always been, ever since peripheries in São Paulo started to be built with 
self-help. Nevertheless, mechanisms that admit and catalyze these residents’ organizing and 
empowerment are needed.  
 The São Paulo City Hall has already implemented a participatory mechanism that is 
active during the upgrading works. Called Management Council, or Conselho Gestor, it gives 
some degree of power to residents and to other stakeholders of communities under upgrading 





residents of already upgraded communities can be more legitimately heard, no matter if in Urban 
Operations-backed projects or if in conventionally-upgraded favelas. It should be said that these 
inhabitants do not need to be tutored by the government. But their organizing capacities—and, 
ultimately, their agency—can and should be amplified.   
 Another example of item that needs to be observed by public officials so that the 
upgrading logic matches the reality of communities is, of course, affordability. The planning and 
design work carried out in Sapé and Real Parque was great. But they are not enough in 
themselves to grant quality of living to the residents of these communities. Social and economic 
policies also have to be conceived in order to allow these people to afford living in an upgraded 
community. 
 Naturally, these socioeconomic policies often times transcend Urban Planning and 
Architecture. And therein lies what I believe to be the biggest challenge of favela upgrading: 
integrating different policy areas into coordinated housing and community development plans 
that are comprehensive and, above all, realistic. 
 This thesis original hypothesis was that public-private upgrading schemes—namely, 
Urban Operations—could be more successful than conventionally-funded schemes when it came 
to providing residents with infrastructure, public services, local economic opportunities, and 
public safety. My conclusion is that, for most variables, the outcomes of the upgrading projects 
of Sapé and Real Parque were actually similar. Urban Operations are more successful in 
gathering financial resources and in providing a higher number of brand-new housing units. 
Nevertheless, I also conclude that both upgrading schemes face very similar challenges when it 





Apart from the mismatch between the rationale and reality of upgrading, there is another 
reason for these mostly similar results. I believe that favela-upgrading’s positive outcomes are 
more connected to implementation than to funding. To understand it better, let us look at the case 
studies. Most of the more abundant resources that Real Parque received seem to have been 
allocated to the clearance and reconstruction of all of its dwellings, as well as to the 
implementation of infrastructure. In Sapé, it looks like not that much money has proportionally 
gone to the construction of housing units. It is true that the latter favela faced more resources 
shortages than the former settlement, but it seems that Sapé dealt with its budget and 
implemented its upgrading plan more rationally. Maybe, if this favela had received more funds, 
there would have been more house replacements. But, from what we have seen, Sapé managed 
its funds in a way in which its upgrading assessment showed similar outcome levels to Real 
Parque’s upgrading.  
 Only by having the public sector improve and refine its upgrading initiatives and by 
amplifying the voices of favela-upgrading beneficiaries, will the São Paulo society accomplish a 
more socially just city. It turns out that the amount of funding is not a real game changer in 
Urban Planning and in Policy-making if other components are not working well. And, for them 
to work well, we need to always have in mind that favela upgrading is not a science. Neither is it 
an experiment, which follows a recipe where the strongest ingredients give out the strongest part 
of the flavor. Favela upgrading is a complex matter of observation, policies integration, people’s 







 Real Parque Sapé 




Housing more new housing units  
1,127 apartments 
less new housing units  
462 apartments 
Infrastructure 




formalized electricity connections 




a few specificities 
institutional building (empty) 
similar improvements 
sewage  
formalized electricity connections 




a few specificities 
bike lane 
linear park along creek 
alleys improvements 
new main street along creek 
Public Services 
Coverage and Public 
Facilities 
similar (poor) 
no new public facilities (health center 
promised but not built) 
similar (poor) 
no new public facilities (public library and 
computing center promised but not built) 
Safety Improvements similar  
(stayed the same or improved a little) 
similar  





about 70 retail spaces provided but not 
maintained; now under control of local 
drug gang 
similarly critical 
no retail spaces provided or allowed; yet, a 
few residents established them 
Land and Property 
Appreciation Effects 
in Surroundings 
similar (low)  
seems to have followed city trend 
similar (low)  





building up around fight for promised 
health unit 
existent  
building up around intention to establish 
residents’ association and to provide 
activities for youth 
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